This is the concluding installment in my series examining how the most reliable economic indicators during the Inflationary Era, perform during periods of deflation. I have done this by examining the Roaring Twenties, Great Depression, New Deal, and the Post WW 2 deflationary recession. The reason for doing so is that we are now in the midst of the first deflationary recession in 60 years. Most indicators used by economists and pundits do not exist or have never been tested that far back in time. Indicators which may work during inflations may not work during deflations. Having set forth the data for you, today we show exactly how two such indicators -- monetary and interest rates -- panned out, and the implications of those conclusions to our present situation.
Previously in Part I of this series, I explained the need to re-examine economic indicators to determine how they performed in previous periods of deflation. In Part II, I looked at the year-over-year M1 vs. CPI indicator during the Roaring Twenties. In Part III, I looked at the same indicator during the 1930s and the post-World War 2 deflationary recession of 1948-49. That examination showed that, in the 1920-1950 period, the M1 vs. CPI indicator generally worked well, but missed the 1927 recession and most importantly of all completely failed to appropriately signal the beginning, duration, or end of the 1929-32 Great Contraction.
IV. Interest rates and the yield curve
In this installment, I will look at NY Fed interest rates, short term rates, and long term rates as they apply to the entire 1920-1950 period.
Previously in Part I of this series, I explained the need to re-examine economic indicators to determine how they performed in previous periods of deflation. In Part II, I looked at the year-over-year M1 vs. CPI indicator during the Roaring Twenties. That examination showed that, in the 1920s, the M1 vs. CPI indicator generally worked well, with two differences from the Inflationary Era: (1) if anything, the indicator slightly lagged signaling the start of recessions, and led signaling expansions; and (2) when M1 was not growing -- when it was stagnant or declining -- it did not signal expansion even though its YoY change was less negative than a CPI deflation.
III. Great Depression, post WW 2 deflation -- monetary indicators
In this installment I will look at the same M1 vs. CPI indicator during the Great Contraction and New Deal portions of the Great Depression, and the brief post World War 2 deflation of 1948-49 (the last significant period of deflation before now).
Before we examine the Great 1929-1932 Contraction, let's look at the Recesion of 1937-38 (as previously, YoY M1 is in blue, CPI is in red):
As with the Roaring Twenties, our monetary indicator works flawlessly here, with M1 declining below CPI in June 1937, only one month after the onset of the recession in May 1937, and exceeding CPI in August 1938, two months after its end in June 1938.
Yesterday I discussed the need, given our deflationary recession, to examine the reliability of economic indicators during past periods of deflation, specifically to the period from 1920 to 1950. Today I begin that examination with the 1920s.
II. The Roaring Twenties: monetary indicators
The Roaring Twenties was an era of productivity- and debt- fueled urban prosperity that contemporaries called "The New Era" in which supposedly all of humanity's economic problems had been solved. Little did people at the time know of the severe hardships that awaited them when the bubble burst. Monetarily the decade was begun with the bursting of World War 1's high inflation (much like Paul Volker was to burst 1970s' inflation 60 years later), that settled into disinflation (declining inflation) and finally into deflation.
Today I will examine the monetary component of Paul Kasriel's "infallible recession indicator" as applied to the 1920s.
The supporting data normally cited in the welter of economic commentary suffers from an important limitation. Almost all of those indicators date from the 1950s and 1960s onward. That is to say, they cover a period where there was not even one single deflationary event. All of their reliability comes from a period of waxing and waning inflation -- but always inflation. As we are experiencing the most significant deflationary recession since the Great Contraction of 1929-32 and the Post World War 1 deflation of 1920-21, the applicability of these indicators is very suspect.
This point was driven home to me when I saw a graph of one such very reliable post-war indicator -- the yield curve -- dating from 1929. The graph re-posted below, shows a relentlessly positive yield curve (short term rates are in green, long term rates in red).
If one were ignorant of history, one would have expected that with the exception of a couple of brief bumps, the economy would have been expanding nicely throughout the entire period from 1929-1950! Even during most of the "great contraction" of 1929-32, the yield curve was positive.
Man oh man, if there ever was a prime example of a revelation of the greatest flaw in libertarian economic theory, it had to be Alan Greenspan's speech. For those not in the know, the former Federal Reserve Chairman spoke before a Congressional committee yesterday. Long one of the grand proponents of laissez fair capitalism, his decisions, ironically, probably has lead to the complete discrediting of such economics.
"Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholder's equity (myself especially) are in a state of shocked disbelief," said Greenspan, who stepped down from the Fed in 2006.
I'll be honest, I never wanted to write up a diary piece like this. A week ago, like many of you, my feelings on "bailing out" Wall Street was equally negative. Why? Why in the name of all that is decent should we clear up the bad judgment of folks who really do not care about the common folk?
For years, folks who would be identified as the type who would get the jobs of running organizations like Goldman Sachs or Lehman Brothers, were considered "Masters of the Universe." For them, we, you and I, were the dirty lowers against their kind. We existed to supplement their income. But now the veil has been lifted, and we see now that they are not masters of anything but their own greed and stupidity.
In Part I of this series, I examined the 1992 best seller entitled "Bankruptcy 1995", which had predicted that the US would become unable to service its national debt as early as 1995 due to soaring budget deficits. So dire and well-documented was the warning that it affected the outcome of the 1992 presidential election, helping to elect Bill Clinton. In light of new looting of the national treasury by George W. Bush and the Republican Congress, I re-read the book to see if any of its predictions were now coming true. I posted those predictions, and the book's thesis that continued budget deficits would drive up interest rates and lead to "Death by Hyperinflation" or "Death by Panic" in Part I.
But "Bankruptcy 1995" obviously didn't happen, in spite of the fact that deficits have continued to be run nearly every year since then. Only part of the reason was the fiscally responsible Clinton tax and budget plan that began in 1993. In this diary I examine how a long-term, continuous decline in interest rates has actually reduced the carrying costs of the National Debt, and why that means the sky Hasn't fallen -- yet.
In the last couple a days a lengthy brief by Aaron Krowne, famous for the "Mortgage Broker Implode-O-Meter", titled Debate Over: It's Hyperinflation (and US Economic Collapse) has gotten extensive attention. The title is pretty self-explanatory. Krowne claims that the Fed's recent negative interest rate policy is going to provoke hyperinflation:
the one thing that is different this time; the only thing on the planet that could truly be the cause of the EXTREME price action in oil, are the actions of the Fed. In specific I mean holding interest rates at the ungodly low rate of 2% -- below even their own doctored inflation reading (which is around 4%); and hell, below even their core inflation reading, which is a percent lower or so.
If you are open minded enough to consider evidence that runs contrary to received wisdom and challenges your assumptions, read on, I hope you will find this thought-provoking.
Because there is some excellent evidence that, if "It's the Economy, Stupid", then there are some very powerful people who have operated some very powerful economic levers to the benefit of one certain Senator John McCain. And the cocaine they are injecting into the economy is going to hit full force by about election day.
Those very powerful people are the Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve Bank, including Fed Chairman Ben Bernancke.
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