What GAO Found The Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (JROTC) is a Department of Defense (DOD) program operating in over 3,400 U.S. public high schools. It is designed to educate students on leadership and citizenship. DOD provided about $439 million in total funding for JROTC in fiscal year 2024. Each military service administers and funds its own JROTC program jointly with participating high schools. In general, JROTC instructors are former or current officers or noncommissioned officers who are certified by their respective military service and employed by schools. In 2022, allegations that JROTC instructors had inappropriately touched, spoken to, or sexually assaulted students raised safety questions about the program. DOD, the military services, host schools, and Education have varying responsibilities in implementing JROTC and addressing allegations of adult sexual misconduct in the program (See fig 1). DOD sets policies and guidance for JROTC. The military services’ and school districts’ responsibilities are laid out in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). Prior to fall 2024, each military service had its own agreement, but the Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act required DOD to develop a standardized one. Figure 1: Selected Roles and Responsibilities for the Junior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (JROTC) aThe Air Force administers the Space Force JROTC program. The Coast Guard also administers a JROTC program under the Department of Homeland Security. This report does not examine Coast Guard JROTC. Based on responses to its nationally generalizable survey of school administrators, GAO estimates that 2 to 7 percent of public high schools with JROTC programs had at least one JROTC instructor who was the subject of an adult sexual misconduct allegation in the prior 5 years. Of the schools with at least one allegation, an estimated 6 percent had at least one substantiated allegation, based on GAO’s survey. Schools are to address allegations of instructor misconduct in accordance with their school district policies. They are also to notify the military service of investigations into alleged JROTC instructor adult sexual misconduct and discipline against instructors. An estimated 89 percent of public high schools with JROTC programs have mandatory training for all school staff—including JROTC instructors—on topics such as recognizing and reporting adult sexual misconduct. An estimated 45 percent require this type of training for students. According to responses to GAO’s survey, an estimated 48 percent of school administrators drop in to observe JROTC classes at least twice a month, and an estimated 30 percent do so monthly. For on-campus JROTC activities that occur outside of school hours, an estimated 18 percent of school administrators drop in frequently and 48 percent do so occasionally. These visits can make administrators aware of and provide an opportunity to address inappropriate instructor behavior, including behaviors that may escalate to adult sexual misconduct. An estimated 49 percent of schools’ codes of conduct policies require the presence of two adults—who could be JROTC instructors or other school staff—for activities outside of regular school hours. In addition, an estimated 43 percent of school policies require the presence of a male and female adult for coed activities outside of regular school hours. Schools may face challenges in having both male and female adults present during coed JROTC activities outside of regular school hours because relatively few JROTC programs (an estimated 11 percent) have both a male and female instructor. In September 2023, DOD entered a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to share information about allegations of adult sexual misconduct in schools that host JROTC programs with the Department of Education. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 generally prohibits sex discrimination—which under certain circumstances includes adult sexual misconduct—in an education program or activity that receives federal funding, such as public schools. The MOU states that Education’s Office for Civil Rights will send DOD resolution letters, letters of findings, and resolution agreements pertaining to complaints alleging discrimination in JROTC programs or activities in violation of federal civil rights laws. In addition, the MOU states that DOD will notify Education of all complaints alleging discrimination in violation of federal civil rights laws, including sex discrimination in JROTC programs. DOD officials told GAO they notify Education of all allegations of adult sexual misconduct that could meet Education’s definition of sex discrimination. Why GAO Did This Study GAO was asked to examine how schools implement JROTC and how Education coordinates with DOD regarding adult sexual misconduct in the program. Sexual misconduct can be a type of sex discrimination. For the purposes of this report, GAO defines adult sexual misconduct as an adult sexually assaulting, sexually harassing, or attempting to develop an intimate or sexual relationship with a student. To provide this information, GAO conducted a nationally generalizable survey of school administrators in public high schools with JROTC programs. The survey asked how schools oversee JROTC, how they prevent and respond to any allegations of adult sexual misconduct, and whether administrators were aware of any of adult sexual misconduct allegations against their school’s JROTC instructors in the prior 5 years. GAO also interviewed Education and DOD officials about how they communicate regarding adult sexual misconduct in JROTC programs, and the agencies’ MOU. For more information, contact Jacqueline Nowicki at nowickij@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Environmental Management (EM) is responsible for cleaning up contaminated soil and legacy landfills resulting from Manhattan Project-era and Cold War-era waste disposal at 12 of its 15 sites. GAO examined eight sites with such contamination and found that site-specific factors inform cleanup decisions in the context of federal and state laws and regulations, as well as agreements EM follows to conduct cleanup. These factors include future land use, physical parameters, and community acceptance. For the eight sites GAO examined, soil and legacy landfill cleanup is estimated to cost approximately $15 billion over the next 6 decades. However, the sites’ estimated scope, schedule, and cost for cleanup may change as more information becomes available. In particular, at two of the sites, EM and regulators have worked for more than a decade on the scope of remedial actions needed to clean up contaminated soil and legacy landfills. The final remedy decisions will affect the sites’ cost estimates. For example, cleanup of one legacy landfill at an EM site in Los Alamos, New Mexico, could cost about $12 million under one potential remedy but about $805 million if another remedy is selected. Removal of Contaminated Soil at Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management EM headquarters is unable to readily identify the scope, schedule, and cost of soil and legacy landfill cleanup over the 12 sites. While EM sites have information on soil and legacy landfill cleanup, sites report data to EM in an aggregated form, with soil cleanup information combined with those of other activities, such as groundwater cleanup. EM’s 2020 Program Management Protocol states that headquarters provides technical and policy support in the planning and field execution of soil and other cleanup. With distinct information on soil cleanup activities, EM headquarters could better provide technical support for planning. In addition, as remedy decisions are made, having information available that is specific to soil and legacy landfill cleanup at EM sites would improve headquarters’ ability to track resources needed to implement remedy decisions and their schedule and cost implications on the entire EM program. Why GAO Did This Study EM is responsible for addressing hazardous and radioactive waste from nuclear weapons production and energy research at DOE sites. Contaminated soil at these sites poses a threat to public health and the environment, making soil and legacy landfill cleanup critical to EM’s mission. GAO was asked to review EM’s soil and legacy landfill cleanup efforts. This report examines (1) the regulatory framework for soil and legacy landfill cleanup at selected EM sites and how site-specific factors inform remedy decisions and (2) available data on the scope, schedule, and cost for soil and legacy landfill cleanup. GAO examined eight sites selected to include various regulatory frameworks governing EM’s cleanup, different stages of cleanup, remaining remediation decisions, and various end uses for the land. GAO conducted site visits at three of these sites. GAO examined relevant laws and regulations and reviewed agency documents on soil and legacy landfill cleanup. GAO interviewed officials from EM, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and state regulatory agencies.

Mission Capable Rates Trends for Selected Army and Marine Corps Ground Vehicles Five of six selected Army ground combat vehicles did not meet mission capable goals in any fiscal year (FY) during the time frame of GAO’s review. In the same time frame, selected Army ground support vehicles achieved mission capable goals about 20 percent of the time. The Marine Corps does not have a mission capable goal for its ground vehicles, though two of seven selected vehicles achieved positive changes in mission capable rates when comparing fiscal years 2015 and 2024. Number of Years That Army Ground Vehicles Met Mission Capable Goals in Fiscal Years 2015 through 2024 Sustainment Challenges Affecting Army and Marine Corps Ground Vehicles Nine sustainment challenges have affected the ground vehicle fleets as shown in the figure on the next page. According to Army and Marine Corps officials, two challenges affected all 18 ground vehicles in this review: a lack of parts and materiel and not having current technical data or drawings. Further, other sustainment challenges that affected many ground vehicles included a shortage of trained or skilled maintainers, service-life issues, and unplanned maintenance. GAO found that the number of overhauls performed by Army depots dropped from 1,278 in FY 2015 to 12 in FY 2024. A senior Army official stated that the Army accepted the risk from the decision to reduce funding for overhauls. Army officials also said reducing overhauls negatively affected the mission capable rates of most vehicles. Further, the Army partially mitigated declining overhauls by harvesting parts from vehicles being phased out of service. Also, the Marine Corps reduced the number of depot overhauls from 725 in FY 2015 to 163 in FY 2024. Marine Corps officials said they have not begun performing overhauls on two recently fielded vehicles and stopped performing overhauls on two others it is phasing out of service. Army and Marine Corps Identified Sustainment Challenges Affecting Selected Ground Vehicles Even as mission capable rates and depot overhauls have declined, the cost of maintaining Army and Marine Corps vehicles has gone up for most selected ground vehicles. Since FY 2015, GAO found the Army’s maintenance costs increased for 9 of the 11 ground vehicles in GAO’s review. For example, when comparing FY 2015 to FY 2023, the Abrams experienced a fleet-wide increase in maintenance costs of $181.3 million and per-vehicle maintenance costs nearly doubled. Meanwhile, availability rates were below the Army’s goal. The Marine Corps’ fleet-wide maintenance costs decreased, although its per-vehicle maintenance costs increased for four of seven vehicles in GAO’s review. Why This Matters The Department of Defense (DOD) spends billions of dollars annually to sustain its weapon systems, including ground vehicles, to ensure that these systems are available to support defense requirements. In FY 2023, the Army and Marine Corps spent more than $2.3 billion combined on depot maintenance of their ground vehicles. Ground vehicles are one type of weapon system sustained by DOD to conduct their missions. Weapon systems are costly to sustain, in part, because they often incorporate a complex array of technical subsystems and components and need expensive repair parts and logistics support to meet required readiness levels. How GAO Did This Study For the 18 selected Army and Marine Corps ground vehicles that provide combat and support roles, this report examines vehicle availability rates in FY 2024, the types of sustainment challenges affecting ground vehicles, and maintenance costs. GAO performed site visits to Army and Marine Corps depots, interviewed cognizant officials, collected and analyzed data about mission capable rates and cost, among other things, and determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this review. Further, GAO collected information on what actions the services have taken to address the sustainment challenges. This is a public version of a sensitive report GAO issued in August 2025. GAO omitted information that DOD deemed Controlled Unclassified Information. For more information, please contact Director Diana Maurer at maurerd@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Federal wildland firefighters, the majority of whom work for the Department of Agriculture’s Forest Service, are critical to protecting lives, property, and natural resources from wildfire. Not only is firefighting inherently risky, but wildland firefighters often work in remote, mountainous terrain that can make it difficult to know their location in relation to the fire or communicate important safety information. The Forest Service’s communications capabilities among wildland firefighters are mostly based on voice communications over radios, which limits sharing important safety information, such as a fire’s intensity and rate of spread, according to agency officials. Forest Service officials said that during fires, they can track and map the locations of aircraft, as well as the agency’s fire vehicles when they are in areas with cellular coverage. However, the agency cannot track and map the locations of most of its firefighters on foot during wildfires. The Forest Service has taken various steps toward improving its communications, tracking, and mapping capabilities for wildland firefighters in recent years. However, Forest Service officials said that loss of staff led the agency to postpone, pause, or reduce the scope of some efforts planned or underway as of July 2025. In addition, Forest Service officials identified several challenges the agency has faced in its improvement efforts. Such challenges range from continuously evolving, expensive technologies to having too few staff with the required mix of technological and firefighting expertise. In facing these challenges, Forest Service officials said the agency does not have a comprehensive strategic plan for improving the agency’s capabilities for two-way communications, tracking, and mapping for wildland firefighters. The officials said it has been difficult to dedicate staff time to such strategic planning amid increasingly intense and long fire seasons. In September 2025, the agency said it had made efforts to improve communications and tracking capabilities a priority for funding and staffing going forward. Developing a comprehensive strategic plan that includes the key components identified in GAO’s prior work, shown in the table below, could better position the Forest Service to improve these capabilities. For example: Defining the goals and objectives for its efforts and the activities and milestones for achieving them could help ensure the Forest Service, Congress, and others understand what the agency aims to achieve and the steps needed to do so. Identifying the expected costs and expertise needed to implement the plan could help the agency and others determine whether it is directing the resources necessary to achieve its goals. Identifying external factors that could affect the agency’s ability to achieve its goals could help the Forest Service mitigate those factors and increase the likelihood of meeting its goals. Key Components of Comprehensive Strategic Plans for Programs Key component Definition Mission statement A comprehensive statement that summarizes the main purposes of the strategy. Problem definition, scope, and methodology Identification of the issues to be addressed by the strategy, the scope of its coverage, the process by which it was developed, and key considerations and assumptions used in the development of the plan. Goals and objectives Identification of goals and objectives to be achieved by the strategy, activities, or actions to achieve them, as well as milestones and performance measures. Activities, milestones, and performance measures Identification of the steps to be taken to achieve the goals and objectives, as well as milestones and performance measures to gauge results. Resources and investments Identification of costs to execute the plan and the sources and types of resources and investments, including skills and technology, human capital, and other resources required to meet the goals and objectives. Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination Development of roles and responsibilities in managing and overseeing the implementation of the strategy and the establishment of mechanisms for multiple stakeholders to coordinate their efforts throughout implementation and make necessary adjustments to the strategy based on performance. Key external factors Identification of key factors external to the organization and beyond its control that could significantly affect the achievement of the long-term goals contained in the strategy. These external factors can include economic, demographic, social, technological, or environmental factors, as well as conditions that would affect the ability of the agency to achieve the results desired. Source: GAO-24-105975. | GAO-25-107905 Why GAO Did This Study Real-time, two-way communications among wildland firefighters and fire managers are critical for firefighter safety. Firefighting conditions can change quickly, and knowing firefighters’ exact positions in relation to a fire allows fire managers and firefighters to more quickly identify dangerous situations. GAO was asked to review the Forest Service’s use of technologies and equipment critical for protecting wildland firefighters. This report examines the Forest Service’s capabilities for communications among firefighters and tracking and mapping their locations, the agency’s next steps for improving those capabilities, and related challenges the agency has identified. GAO reviewed documents from the Forest Service and others and interviewed and reviewed written responses from Forest Service officials.

What GAO Found The U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is intended to help low-income individuals and families obtain a more nutritious diet by supplementing their income with benefits to purchase food. USDA's Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) oversees SNAP and provides guidance and technical assistance to states that administer it. Benefits are loaded onto Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) cards. SNAP benefit theft occurs when thieves use unauthorized, electronic methods to take control of an EBT account without a recipient's knowledge. EBT cards are a target for theft because most cards do not yet have certain theft-prevention features, such as embedded microchips, which are standard in the commercial debit and credit card industry and help prevent card fraud. Security Features of SNAP EBT Cards FNS has taken some steps to help prevent SNAP EBT theft. In October 2022, the agency provided guidance to state SNAP agencies on tools and resources that they may use to prevent EBT theft, such as allowing SNAP recipients to block specific types of transactions in advance that are likely to be fraudulent. In addition, as of May 2025, the agency was developing a proposed rule that it said would require state SNAP agencies to implement certain card security measures. Further, FNS has four pilot project projects underway, including one that involves automatically blocking potentially fraudulent transactions, such as purchases made outside of the SNAP recipient's home state. According to FNS, thieves largely use stolen SNAP account information to make purchases in a different state. For their part, state SNAP agencies have implemented a variety of measures to prevent EBT card skimming—collecting key card information through an unauthorized device— and related fraud. As of May 2025, one state—California—has modernized its SNAP EBT cards to include microchips, which better align with credit and debit card industry security standards to help prevent benefit theft. Six other states have ongoing SNAP EBT card modernization projects. However, FNS has not comprehensively assessed what benefit theft prevention measures state SNAP agencies are implementing, including those it recommended in October 2022. As a result, the agency does not have information to determine the extent to which these measures are being used across states and any barriers to their full implementation and effectiveness. Conducting such an assessment would also allow FNS to target assistance to state SNAP agencies and help reduce fraud, which is consistent with its fiscal year 2025 priorities. GAO recommends that USDA comprehensively assess the SNAP benefit theft prevention measures state agencies are implementing to help enhance its efforts to address EBT theft and provide assistance to states. We provided a draft of this report to USDA for review and comment. USDA did not provide comments on the report. Why GAO Did This Study Hundreds of millions of dollars in benefits have been reported stolen from SNAP recipients' EBT cards in recent years. SNAP will provide approximately $96 billion in benefits to about 43 million people in fiscal year 2025. Theft of benefits could leave victims without means to purchase food, particularly since benefits stolen on or after December 21, 2024, are not eligible for replacement with federal funds. The Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025 includes a provision for GAO to among other things examine efforts to prevent SNAP EBT theft. This report provides information about the steps USDA has taken to prevent SNAP benefit theft and evaluates the extent to which USDA assesses how state SNAP agencies have implemented measures to prevent such theft. To provide this information, GAO conducted a content analysis, reviewed relevant USDA guidance and other documentation, and interviewed and obtained written responses from USDA officials. We also interviewed knowledgeable stakeholder organizations, including EBT processors. We selected these organizations because they have national perspectives on EBT systems and measures that can help prevent SNAP benefit theft.

What GAO Found The Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) is the government’s principal repository for procurement information, some of which is displayed on USAspending.gov, the official source of federal spending data. In fiscal year 2024, federal agencies reported about $755 billion in procurement obligations to FPDS. FPDS is part of the Integrated Award Environment (IAE), a suite of systems administered by the General Services Administration (GSA) that tracks federal award data. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides guidance to agencies for annually certifying the quality of the data they report to FPDS. Agencies do so through procurement data quality reports. Of the 70 federal agencies that reported data to FPDS for fiscal year 2023, 36, or 51 percent, confirmed completion of procurement data quality reports. Agency Completion of Procurement Data Quality Reports, Fiscal Year 2023 aOf these 34 agencies, 23 did not complete a report and 11 did not respond to GAO’s requests to provide copies of their reports, if any. These 34 agencies accounted for almost $2 billion, or about 0.26 percent, of the $759.2 billion in contract obligations reported to FPDS for fiscal year 2023. In addition, the 24 agencies’ procurement data quality reports GAO reviewed did not meet all relevant OMB reporting requirements. For example, two did not certify that procurement data were timely entered into FPDS, and 19 did not submit their reports within OMB’s deadline. Implementing monitoring procedures would help OMB ensure that agencies are meeting OMB requirements, thus providing assurance about the quality of federal procurement data. GAO also found that five selected agencies varied in the extent to which their verification and validation procedures and corrective actions help ensure procurement data quality. For example, one did not design a statistically valid sampling methodology, and three did not adequately develop or document corrective actions to address identified issues. While two have since addressed other issues GAO found, remaining issues could be addressed by enhancing sampling procedures and documenting corrective actions to help ensure that selected agencies adhere to OMB requirements and improve procurement data quality. As of May 2025, GSA had consolidated and retired 10 of its 13 IAE legacy systems. However, GSA lacks a plan and timeline to modernize the remaining three systems, including FPDS. By finalizing a plan to complete the modernization of its IAE systems, GSA would help create a more streamlined, efficient, and integrated federal acquisition process. Why GAO Did This Study Ensuring procurement data quality helps agencies and policymakers make data-driven decisions, improve public trust, and promote the efficiency and effectiveness of government. GAO was asked to review various aspects of data quality on USAspending.gov and its feeder systems, as well as the modernization of the IAE. This report examines, among other objectives, the extent to which (1) agencies completed procurement data quality reports consistent with relevant guidance; (2) selected agencies have procedures and corrective actions to help ensure procurement data quality in FPDS; and (3) GSA developed modernization plans for the IAE legacy systems, including FPDS. GAO reviewed procurement data quality reports for fiscal year 2023, which were the most recently available at the time of its review. To understand agencies’ relevant policies and procedures, GAO obtained and reviewed agency documents. GAO also interviewed officials at GSA and the Departments of Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Health and Human Services (HHS), and Veterans Affairs (VA). GAO selected these agencies because they had the largest contract obligations. GAO also interviewed staff at OMB.

What GAO Found The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (Commission) has not addressed numerous management and operational weaknesses. According to senior officials, Commission leaders have often been disengaged from administering the Commission's operations and have generally not addressed key challenges faced in carrying out its administrative functions. GAO identified a range of challenges, including: Agency performance management. The Commission has not fully incorporated key practices for managing its performance. Although it has established long-term goals in its strategic plan, the Commission does not have ways to measure progress toward most of those goals or consistently use reliable performance data to set new goals. Officials said that current and past Commission chairs were not fully aware of performance management requirements. As a result, the Commission is missing opportunities to improve its effectiveness and efficiency. Workforce planning. The Commission lacks a comprehensive workforce plan, which would help address the Commission's operational challenges and future staffing needs. Officials acknowledged that the Commission lacks staff with human capital, financial, and other key skills, but it has not filled those gaps. The Commission also faced performance challenges due to several Administrative Law Judge retirements. One senior official told us the Commission lacks a succession plan even though all judges have been eligible to retire since 2022. Other internal control deficiencies. The Commission has not addressed several internal control deficiencies to improve its operations. For example, the Commission's 2024 financial audit found an inadequate budget approval process, but a senior Commission official said the Commission could not fully address that deficiency without additional skilled personnel, and they do not have a plan to hire those personnel. In addition, the Commission has not established processes to manage its risks, ensure it is complying with relevant laws and regulations, or address other deficiencies. Since 2021, the Commission has sought, with limited success, oversight for a variety of alleged improprieties and personnel matters. Many federal agencies have an Inspector General (IG) to investigate such allegations, but the Commission lacks an IG and instead sought assistance from several third parties. The Commission received limited investigative support from an external IG and the Office of Special Counsel. However, the Commission was unable to secure assistance to investigate allegations of improper procurement activities against a senior official, who remained on paid administrative leave for more than 3 years. Given the Commission's challenges obtaining oversight support, it would benefit from having an IG designated in statute. The IG could be from a larger agency with related expertise and should be provided with appropriate resources to take on Commission oversight. Why GAO Did This Study In 2024, about 327,000 miners worked at nearly 12,700 U.S. mines. By law, U.S. mines must undergo routine inspections to ensure they meet federal health and safety standards. The Commission reviews legal disputes about violations of these standards. It has an $18 million budget and about 60 employees. GAO was asked to review the Commission's operations and oversight. This report examines (1) how the Commission is addressing management weaknesses and (2) the challenges it has faced accessing independent oversight and options that exist to obtain support from an IG. GAO reviewed Commission documents and external audits and interviewed agency officials and federal and industry stakeholders. GAO also assessed the Commission's performance against relevant federal laws, regulations, and internal control standards. In addition, GAO interviewed several investigative agencies, IGs, and other federal stakeholders about strategies for agencies to access independent oversight.

What GAO Found Department of Energy (DOE) sites have long used per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) for purposes such as firefighting and uranium enrichment. These chemicals can harm human health and the environment, and are highly mobile, persistent, and resistant to degradation. To understand the status of PFAS efforts throughout the department, DOE surveyed 57 of its sites, focusing on Manhattan Project and Cold War-era sites. As of 2024, 20 of 57 surveyed sites had completed their initial reviews of historical and current use, 21 are in progress, and 16 have not started. Additionally, there are over 100 DOE sites that were not surveyed—such as electrical substations and transformers managed by the Power Marketing Administrations, and their actions to review historical PFAS use are unknown. A 2021 policy memo from the Deputy Secretary of Energy directed all DOE program offices to characterize PFAS use at DOE sites, but the memo did not have a deadline for completing such work. If sites do not review their historical and current use of PFAS, DOE will not know the extent of where PFAS contamination poses a risk to human health and the environment or be able to effectively prioritize cleanup actions and estimate cleanup costs. Example of the Department of Energy’s Historical Use of Firefighting Foam Containing Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances During Training Seventeen of the 57 surveyed DOE sites have on-site drinking water systems, and they have all tested for PFAS. Three of these sites reported contamination levels exceeding the federal maximum contaminant levels of 4.0 parts per trillion for perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) or perfluorooctane sulfonate—also known as perfluorooctanesulfonic acid—(PFOS) in drinking water, though these levels do not go into effect until 2029. These three sites treat or provide bottled water to workers. Regarding groundwater, 17 of the 57 surveyed sites tested for PFAS in groundwater. Ten of these sites reported levels in their groundwater that were higher than the federal maximum contaminant level for drinking water. While this standard is not directly applicable to groundwater, DOE has used drinking water standards as groundwater cleanup targets for other environmental cleanup efforts. DOE is early in the process of investigating and cleaning up PFAS contamination. GAO selected nine sites with known PFAS contamination for additional analysis. Two of the nine selected sites have started PFAS groundwater cleanup efforts. For example, since October 2022, Brookhaven National Laboratory has treated over 700 million gallons of water for PFAS through groundwater treatment systems. For the nine selected sites, DOE reported spending a total of about $20 million through 2024 on PFAS efforts. Most of these costs were related to active treatment efforts at Brookhaven National Laboratory. DOE has not generally included estimated PFAS investigation and cleanup costs in its environmental liabilities, which means that future cleanup costs will be higher than the currently reported liabilities. Why GAO Did This Study Certain PFAS have been associated with negative impacts to human health and the environment, including infertility and cancer. DOE sites across the country have used PFAS for a variety of purposes, including in firefighting and uranium enrichment, potentially leading to releases into the environment. In 2024, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finalized rules that establish legally enforceable maximum contaminant levels for six PFAS in drinking water and designate two of them—PFOA and PFOS—as hazardous substances under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as amended. In May 2025, EPA leaders announced that they plan to rescind the maximum contaminant levels for several types of PFAS but intend to keep the ones for PFOA and PFOS. DOE sites with on-site drinking water systems and those with releases of PFOA or PFOS will need to comply with EPA’s new rules. GAO was asked to review DOE’s cleanup of PFAS. This report examines the laws and regulations relevant to cleanup efforts, and DOE’s cleanup plans, identification, disposal, testing, and cleanup of PFAS contamination; spending on PFAS-related efforts; and estimated future costs. GAO assessed documents related to PFAS plans, activities, and regulatory requirements. GAO examined nine DOE sites (and visited seven) selected to represent a variety of offices and locations with PFAS contamination to better understand DOE’s PFAS plans, contamination, and cleanup activities. GAO interviewed DOE officials at these nine sites, as well as six DOE offices, and the respective state and federal regulators for those selected sites.

What GAO Found The World Bank oversees the Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance in Ukraine (PEACE) project that has provided direct budget support (DBS) to Ukraine, while the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) helped oversee U.S. funding to PEACE until this responsibility was transferred to State in July 2025. DBS reimburses Ukraine’s government for eligible salaries and social assistance benefits (see figure). From July 2022 to June 2025, USAID hired contractors to oversee DBS funding and used information from contractors’ reports to enhance this oversight. For example, USAID asked one contractor to review more healthcare worker salaries after they found discrepancies. USAID canceled one of its oversight contracts in February 2025 and State officials said they took over the other in July 2025 as part of the reorganization of foreign assistance. These changes reduced U.S. oversight of DBS funding. U.S. Funding Provided to Ukraine through the PEACE Project, as of November 2024 USAID did not regularly verify or use all available data to inform DBS oversight. While USAID reviewed aggregated expenditure data, it did not review the detailed data it received. We analyzed a subset of this data and identified 161 unusual increases out of 5,121 expenditure changes. Finding the cause for these increases would inform any continuing oversight of U.S. DBS funding. Further, information USAID reported to Congress on Ukraine’s use of this funding may be incomplete because USAID did not update this reporting once new data became available. USAID also did not submit one required report to Congress. Ensuring accurate and complete reports would provide Congress with greater transparency about how U.S. DBS funding was used. USAID and World Bank contractors identified weaknesses in Ukraine’s internal controls for managing PEACE project funding, such as decentralized processes. In response, USAID’s contractor developed 56 recommendations to strengthen related controls. Ukrainian officials GAO met with in Kyiv generally agreed with the recommendations, but said they would take time to implement. USAID did not assess the weaknesses to determine which present the highest risk to managing DBS funding. Taking steps to assess these weaknesses would help Ukraine prioritize its efforts on addressing the highest risks to managing DBS. A World Bank contractor also identified weaknesses in Ukraine’s internal controls for managing DBS. According to the World Bank, although these weaknesses pose risks, they are mitigated by the project’s multi-layered oversight. However, USAID did not consistently request updates on Ukraine’s actions to address the weaknesses which could help focus U.S. oversight priorities on areas more vulnerable to waste, fraud, or abuse. Why GAO Did This Study The United States has provided over $45 billion in DBS to Ukraine since Russia's February 2022 invasion. This DBS supports Ukraine’s critical government functions. USAID managed $30.2 billion in appropriated funds, with most provided through the World Bank’s PEACE project. As of December 2024, all of this funding had been disbursed to Ukraine. Treasury also disbursed $20 billion to the World Bank for economic aid to Ukraine, including at least $15 billion for DBS, using revenues earned from immobilized Russian assets. As of July 2025, the World Bank had disbursed $4.64 billion of this funding to Ukraine through the PEACE project. GAO was asked to evaluate the oversight of U.S. DBS funding provided to Ukraine through the PEACE project. This report examines (1) how USAID’s oversight for U.S. DBS funding changed over time, (2) the extent to which USAID ensured it had quality data to inform its oversight activities and congressional reporting; and (3) weaknesses identified in Ukraine’s processes for managing DBS funding and the extent to which USAID ensured those weaknesses were addressed. GAO reviewed documents from USAID and the World Bank, their contractors, and the Ukrainian government; met with officials in Washington, D.C.; conducted a site visit to Ukraine; and analyzed PEACE project-related data.

What GAO Found The federal statistical system faces a critical juncture as it works to modernize and adapt to a rapidly changing data landscape, driven by increasing demand for timely, detailed, and relevant information amid declining survey response rates and rising data collection costs. During a forum GAO held in 2024, experts and stakeholders identified various challenges and opportunities facing the system across a range of topics (see figure). Figure: Key Topics Discussed at the Forum on the U.S. Statistical System Public Trust. The system faces growing challenges in building and maintaining public trust, particularly as it navigates emerging risks to privacy and confidentiality, according to participants. Suggestions for improving public trust include promoting transparency and advancing privacy enhancing technologies. Data Access and Support. According to participants, the system faces challenges in meeting the needs of a diverse user base, from highly technical researchers to non-technical data users, and in facilitating access to data products. The system also faces challenges in offering appropriate guidance and tools tailored to users. Potential options for addressing these challenges include expanding data user outreach and training, as well as developing a streamlined data access portal with enhanced analytic capabilities and support. Alternative Data Sources. Participants highlighted key benefits that alternative data sources—such as private sector data and administrative records—offer for improving federal statistical production and better meeting the needs of data users. Yet participants said that statistical agencies face significant challenges in using alternative data, including legal barriers and dependance on data providers. Participants said that addressing these issues will require strong data security and incentives for provider participation, among other things. Interagency Coordination. Participants identified effective interagency coordination as key for modernizing statistical production, facilitating outreach to users, and alleviating resource constraints. However, the decentralized design of the system and the absence of a shared framework for interagency data sharing hinder coordination among agencies, creating barriers to data sharing. Suggestions for strengthening interagency coordination include modernizing legislation and establishing shared data infrastructure. Why GAO Did This Study The federal statistical system includes 16 statistical agencies and units and over 100 statistical programs that produce data critical for program design, monitoring, and evaluation of federal programs. These data are vital for decisions that directly affect the public. These include the allocation of federal funding to states and localities and the production of key national statistics on health, demographics, and the economy. However, the system faces long-standing challenges that may prevent these agencies from effectively producing timely and accurate information. In August 2024, GAO held a forum on the federal statistical system. The participants discussed what factors affect the system’s ability to (1) build and maintain public trust, (2) meet the needs of its users, (3) sustain and modernize its data collection, and (4) engage in effective interagency coordination. This report is the first in a body of work to assess opportunities to reduce fragmentation, overlap, and duplication in the system, consistent with a statutory provision for GAO to, among other things, routinely investigate government programs to identify duplicative goals and activities. Participants included 29 experts and stakeholders from the federal statistical system, other federal agencies, state and local government agencies, a non-U.S. national statistical office, an international organization, academic institutions, the private sector, and professional organizations. GAO also interviewed officials from federal and state government agencies. Participants reviewed a draft of this report, and comments were incorporated as appropriate. Views expressed during the proceedings do not represent the opinions of all participants, their affiliated organizations, or GAO. For more information, contact Jared Smith at SmithJB@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) requires the Department of the Treasury to administer a program in which the federal government would share some of the losses from a certified act of terrorism with private insurers. After an event is certified (determined to have met certain criteria), Treasury reimburses insurers for the federal share of losses, after insurers pay mandated deductibles. The terrorism insurance market has been stable under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program. Treasury reported in 2024 that the insurance is generally available and affordable. In 2021, Treasury clarified that the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program can cover terrorism losses on eligible cyber policies. But certifying cyberattacks under TRIA can be challenging for three reasons: Cyberattacks may not meet TRIA’s requirement that an attack be violent or dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure. Cyberattacks may not readily meet the TRIA requirement that attacks be part of an effort to coerce the U.S. population or government, or influence policy. Cyberattacks may not meet the TRIA requirements that damage occur in the U.S. or in specific areas outside the U.S. Additionally, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and the Federal Insurance Office have not completed an assessment on whether cybersecurity risks warrant a specific federal insurance response. GAO’s recommendations to both agencies to conduct such an assessment remain open. If Congress were to consider legislation for a federal cyber insurance response, GAO’s framework for providing federal assistance to private market participants could help inform its design, such as taking steps to mitigate moral hazard. Past changes to TRIA reduced federal fiscal exposure, but some future changes may affect affordability and availability. Each reauthorization of TRIA through 2015 reduced the magnitude of the government’s explicit fiscal exposure, such as by increasing the insurer deductible from 7 percent of premiums in 2003 to 20 percent in 2020. GAO found changes to the industry aggregate retention would have a higher impact on federal fiscal exposure than changing the deductible or coshare parameters. Insurers told GAO they considered the potential effect of program changes in each reauthorization and modified risk-mitigation strategies, as needed. However, some program changes, such as those to the deductible and copayment share, and program triggers could affect the availability and affordability of terrorism insurance. There could be significant disruptions to the insurance market if no federal terrorism risk insurance program existed. Our analysis of insurance data and information from Treasury and industry found TRIA’s federal backstop has played a role in stabilizing the terrorism insurance market. In the absence of a loss-sharing program, insurers likely would limit coverage or exit certain markets. Why GAO Did This Study In November 2002 Congress enacted TRIA to protect businesses, ensure widespread availability and affordability of insurance for terrorism risk, and respond to concerns about how absence of such coverage would affect the U.S. economy. This statement for the record provides information on (1) the stability of the terrorism insurance market, (2) TRIA’s ability to cover cyber losses, (3) the impact of past TRIA changes on federal fiscal exposure and the potential impact of further changes, and (4) how the absence of TRIA could affect the terrorism insurance market. This statement is based on GAO’s prior reports from May 2014 to June 2022. Detailed information on GAO’s objectives, scopes, and methodologies can be found in the published reports.

What GAO Found In fiscal year (FY) 2023, about 50 percent of all Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program awards were from open topics—totaling about $2.2 billion—with the remaining awards from conventional topics. There are two types of topics: open or conventional. For solicitations that include open topics, agencies provide broad topics, and small businesses submit proposals that identify research needs and propose a solution. For solicitations that include conventional topics, agencies define research needs, and small businesses respond with proposed solutions. GAO found that open topic awards may promote competition, as these awards attracted more first-time applicants compared with conventional topics. Of the 11 agencies that participated in the SBIR and STTR programs in FY 2023, four exclusively issued open topic awards, four exclusively issued conventional topic awards, and the remaining three issued both types of awards. The SBIR and STTR Extension Act of 2022 required the Small Business Administration (SBA), which oversees the programs, to collect and report data on open and conventional topics. However, GAO found that participating agencies categorized their open and conventional topics inconsistently in FY 2023. For example, more than one-third of solicitations released by three agencies with conventional topic labels were as broad as solicitations labeled open topics from other agencies. Analysis of Open and Conventional Topics Across the 11 Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer Agencies, Fiscal Year 2023 This inconsistency is due, in part, to current SBA guidance, which does not define open and conventional topics or clearly distinguish how they differ. Without clear and documented government-wide definitions, agencies may continue to interpret and label topic types differently, which limits the comparability of data across agencies and usefulness of SBA’s data. This, in turn, may hinder SBA’s ability to assess program performance and the outcomes associated with different topic types, as well as Congress’s ability to effectively oversee the SBIR and STTR programs. Why GAO Did This Study To help drive economic growth, agencies provide SBIR and STTR awards to small businesses, which otherwise may encounter difficulty funding research and development. For these awards, agencies release solicitations that include open and conventional topics. The SBIR and STTR Extension Act of 2022 includes provisions for GAO to review agencies’ use of open topics. This report examines the extent to which agencies issued open topic awards in FY 2023 (the most recent data available at the time of GAO’s review) and how agencies’ FY 2023 topics compared in terms of specificity, among other objectives. GAO analyzed data from 11 participating agencies and SBA for over 33,000 awards issued from FY 2019 through FY 2023—the most recent data available at the time of GAO’s review. To compare topic specificity across participating agencies, GAO analyzed nearly 1,000 topics that the participating agencies released in their FY 2023 solicitations and assessed how specific each topic was. GAO also reviewed statutory requirements and interviewed agency officials and 22 randomly selected small businesses.

What GAO Found Companies that own and operate nuclear power plants in the United States are generally considered by credit rating agencies to have an adequate or strong ability to meet their financial obligations with overall stable credit outlooks. Market and other factors affect the financial condition of nuclear power plants. These factors include the type of market in which a plant operates, electricity prices, and the availability of federal and state tax credits. For example, companies operating in rate-regulated markets, where companies sell electricity at a rate established or approved by a state public service or public utility commission, face less financial risk associated with fluctuating electricity prices. By contrast, companies operating in competitive markets, where the price of electricity is determined by supply and demand, must absorb the costs of any such fluctuations. In addition, the availability of federal and state tax credits can also affect the financial condition of nuclear power plants. For example, state and federal tax credits available to nuclear power plants can help offset costs by providing funding to repair or replace at-risk reactors or by providing additional revenue. Tax credits can also provide some financial certainty to nuclear power plant companies. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for regulating commercial nuclear power reactors, among other things. To oversee safety, NRC primarily relies on its Reactor Oversight Process—NRC's program to inspect, measure, and assess the safety and security performance of operating commercial nuclear power plants, and to respond to any decline in their performance. NRC's Reactor Oversight Process focuses on monitoring and inspections of plant activities that have the greatest effect on safety and overall risk. If a plant's performance indicators or inspection findings raise concerns, NRC conducts supplemental inspections that are more targeted and in-depth. Information from performance indicator reports and inspections informs an assessment of a plant's overall safety posture. NRC uses nuclear power plant financial information for licensing and other purposes. Specifically, NRC conducts a financial qualification review of nuclear power plants at initial licensing and license transfer to determine whether the applicant has adequate funds to cover the cost of construction and operations. NRC generally does not use financial information to inform its ongoing oversight processes once a license has been issued. According to NRC officials, NRC can review such information if deemed necessary. For example, officials said that NRC staff monitor industry information, and if they find information about the financial condition of a plant that could raise questions about safety, they may request additional information from that plant and conduct a more in-depth review. Why GAO Did This Study The United States has the largest fleet of nuclear power reactors in the world, and nuclear power has accounted for about 20 percent of annual U.S. electricity generation since the late 1980s. In recent years, nuclear energy has provided nearly half of our nation's carbon-free electricity, making it the largest domestic source of carbon-free energy. Currently, the United States has 94 operating commercial nuclear reactors at 54 nuclear power plants in 28 states. The average age of nuclear reactors in the United States is about 42 years old. The federal government, through the NRC, regulates commercial nuclear power reactors by certifying designs, issuing licenses and license renewals, and conducting inspections, among other things. NRC's mission involves protecting public health and safety through efficient and reliable licensing, oversight, and regulation. In recent years, the U.S. nuclear power industry has faced economic and financial challenges, particularly for reactors located in competitive power markets where natural gas and renewable power generators influence wholesale electricity prices. A House report accompanying the Energy and Water Development appropriations bills for fiscal year 2024 includes a provision for GAO to provide a report on NRC oversight of nuclear power plant safety and mechanisms for ensuring adequate protection of public health and safety. Specifically, the House report raised questions about the potential effect of financial pressure on the safety of U.S. nuclear power plants. This report describes the factors that affect the financial condition of nuclear power plants, and the information NRC uses to inform licensing and oversight of plant safety. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed industry reports on financial challenges facing the industry, plant safety and operations, and credit outlooks for the nuclear power industry. GAO also reviewed relevant laws, regulations, and agency guidance to understand NRC's overall safety processes, and interviewed NRC officials and 12 stakeholders, including academics, industry groups, nuclear power plant companies, and credit rating agencies. For more information, contact Frank Rusco at RuscoF@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Problem gambling, according to the National Council on Problem Gambling, is gambling behavior that is damaging to a person or their family, often disrupting their daily life or careers. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the military services generally do not use the term problem gambling and instead more commonly use the term gambling disorder, which generally refers to a clinical diagnosis. DOD collects data related to gambling disorder from health surveys it administers to service members, and the Defense Health Agency (DHA) maintains records of encounters with service members diagnosed with gambling disorder. For example, there were 185 active-duty service members with a gambling-related diagnosis in fiscal year 2024. In January 2025, DOD revised its instruction on substance use to include gambling disorder. This guidance outlines the steps the department and the military services should take to help prevent and treat gambling disorder among service members. However, the instruction does not identify a party responsible for implementation of certain tasks such as designating staff who will be trained to prevent, assess, diagnose, and treat gambling disorders, and DHA has not established a time frame for issuing implementing guidance that would do so. In addition, each military service has substance use policies and procedures that include gambling disorder. However, these policies do not fully reflect all the changes made to the DOD instruction because according to officials, the services have not updated their guidance to meet the new requirements for gambling disorder. By defining all roles and responsibilities for gambling disorder prevention and treatment, and by ensuring that subsequent updates are made to service-specific guidance to meet the new requirements for gambling disorder, DOD can increase its ability to address issues related to gambling among service members. The military services operate recreational gaming machines (i.e., slot machines) at certain installations overseas to provide recreational opportunities to service members, their adult family members, and other members of the community. According to DOD officials, revenues generated from these machines are reinvested in Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) quality of life programs such as childcare and fitness programs. However, the military services' instructions relating to MWR activities, which include these gaming operations, do not consistently include guidance with clear requirements for responsible gaming practices. Such guidance may include requirements for posting signage identifying the signs of gambling addiction and who to contact if help is needed. By issuing guidance with clear requirements for responsible gaming practices at overseas installations, the military services could help prevent or respond to problem gambling by users of their recreational gaming machines. Why GAO Did This Study Many forms of gambling have become increasingly available to service members in the United States, including sports betting and privately owned casinos located near major DOD installations. According to a 2021 academic study, service members may be more likely to have problem gambling issues than the general population due to demographic risk factors such as being younger and having a higher propensity for risk-taking. Senate Report 118-58, which accompanied a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, includes a provision for GAO to review what is known about the degree to which service members are struggling with problem gambling and about the support provided to these individuals. This report examines the information DOD collects about problem gambling, the guidance in place to prevent and respond to problem gambling, and DOD's recreational gaming machines overseas. GAO analyzed data on the number of active-duty service members with gambling-related diagnoses. GAO met virtually or in-person with officials at four installations and interviewed unit leadership, health care providers, financial counselors, and chaplains to discuss the prevalence of problem gambling and what services are provided to service members struggling with problem gambling. GAO reviewed gaming policies and procedures in the military services' MWR guidance and interviewed MWR officials to determine what guidance is in place to facilitate responsible gaming at overseas installations with recreational gaming machines.

What GAO Found Physicians have become increasingly consolidated as the share of physicians in practices owned by other entities has increased over time. For example, studies show that at least 47 percent of physicians were employed by or affiliated with hospital systems in 2024, up from less than 30 percent in 2012. Estimates of the share of physicians consolidated with health insurers and corporate entities vary. Private equity ownership of or investment in physician practices represents a small but growing share of physicians nationally—about 6.5 percent in 2024—but shares varied by specialty and geographic market, according to studies GAO reviewed. Entities that May Consolidate with Physician Practices Studies indicate that physician consolidation with hospital systems can lead to increased spending and prices. For example, several studies found increased Medicare spending due to services being provided in more expensive hospital-based settings and increases to prices paid by commercial insurers following hospital-physician consolidation. In contrast, this type of consolidation generally resulted in no changes in the quality of care. Studies examining the effects of physician consolidation involving private equity firms were limited, but provided some evidence of price increases for commercial insurance. There were several areas where GAO did not identify rigorous studies on the effects of physician consolidation. These areas include the effects of consolidation by hospital systems on patient access to care; consolidation by insurers or other corporate entities on spending, prices, quality, or access; and private equity investment on quality and access. Why GAO Did This Study In recent years, the health care sector in the United States has become increasingly consolidated. This has given rise to concerns that consolidation may result in decreased competition and increased costs to patients, employers, health insurers, and federal health care programs. Physician consolidation occurs when practices merge together or are acquired by or affiliate with other entities. House Report 117-403 includes a provision for GAO to study the extent health care consolidation is taking place across Medicare and Medicaid markets, and how private equity could be contributing. This report describes what available research indicates about (1) the extent of physician consolidation, including practice ownership by hospital systems, corporate entities, or private equity firms; and (2) the effects of these types of physician consolidation on health care spending and prices, quality of care, and access. GAO reviewed relevant literature, including peer-reviewed studies and reports published from January 2021 through July 2025 by researchers, stakeholder groups, and others. GAO also interviewed or received written responses from 14 selected stakeholders, as well as four organizations that collect or analyze relevant data on physician employment. Stakeholders included groups representing physicians, hospitals, health insurers, private equity firms, retail companies, and employers. For more information, contact Leslie V. Gordon at GordonLV@gao.gov.