What GAO Found In August 2025, GAO identified 23 open recommendations under the purview of the Department of Commerce (Commerce) Chief Information Officer (CIO), including seven that are relevant to component-level CIOs, from previously issued work. Each of these recommendations relates to a GAO High-Risk area: (1) Ensuring the Cybersecurity of the Nation or (2) Improving IT Acquisitions and Management. In addition, GAO has designated four of the 23 as priority recommendations. For example, GAO previously recommended that Commerce fully implement all cybersecurity event logging requirements as directed by the Office of Management and Budget. Further, GAO recommended that the National Telecommunications and Information Administration develop a comprehensive, organizational risk assessment. GAO also previously recommended that the department complete annual reviews of its IT portfolio in conjunction with the Federal CIO. The CIO's continued attention to these recommendations will help ensure the secure and effective use of IT at the department. Why GAO Did This Study CIO open recommendations are outstanding GAO recommendations that warrant the attention of agency CIOs because their implementation could significantly improve government IT operations by securing IT systems, identifying cost savings, improving major government programs, eliminating mismanagement of IT programs and processes, or ensuring that IT programs comply with laws, among others. For more information, contact Nick Marinos at marinosn@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In June 2024, GAO identified five priority recommendations for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). Since then, NASA implemented two of those recommendations. First, NASA took steps to identify a range of missions for future variants of the Space Launch System rocket, which will improve understanding of how these variants will support upcoming Artemis missions. Second, NASA took steps to fully define and document the role of the senior agency official for privacy or other designated privacy official in reviewing and approving certain information to be used in systems with personally identifiable information, or PII. By taking these steps, NASA has greater assurance that privacy protections are applied to systems with PII. As of August 2025, GAO did not identify any additional priority recommendations for NASA, leaving the total number at three. These recommendations involve the following areas: monitoring program costs and execution, and using federal contracting metrics. NASA's continued attention to these issues could lead to significant improvements in government operations. Why GAO Did This Study Priority open recommendations are the GAO recommendations that warrant priority attention from heads of key departments or agencies because their implementation could save large amounts of money; improve congressional and/or executive branch decision-making on major issues; eliminate mismanagement, fraud, and abuse; or ensure that programs comply with laws and funds are legally spent, among other benefits. Since 2015, GAO has sent letters to selected agencies to highlight the importance of implementing such recommendations. For more information, contact Timothy J. DiNapoli at Dinapolit@gao.gov.

What GAO Found In August 2025, GAO identified 36 open recommendations under the purview of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Chief Information Officer (CIO), including 22 that are sensitive, from previously issued work. Each of these recommendations relates to a GAO High-Risk area: (1) Ensuring the Cybersecurity of the Nation or (2) Improving IT Acquisitions and Management. In addition, GAO has designated two of the 36 as priority recommendations. For example, GAO previously recommended that the IRS maintain a comprehensive inventory of its systems that process or store taxpayer information. Further, GAO recommended that the IRS fully address the key Office of Management and Budget requirement regarding conducting regular evaluations of customer experiences and user needs. GAO also previously recommended that the agency includes programs' cost and schedule history and fiscal year and overall goals in its quarterly reports to Congress. The CIO's continued attention to these recommendations will help ensure the secure and effective use of IT at the agency. Why GAO Did This Study CIO open recommendations are outstanding GAO recommendations that warrant the attention of agency CIOs because their implementation could significantly improve government IT operations by securing IT systems, identifying cost savings, improving major government programs, eliminating mismanagement of IT programs and processes, or ensuring that IT programs comply with laws, among others. For more information, contact Nick Marinos at marinosn@gao.gov.

What GAO Found GAO assessed the status of 41 recommendations made by GAO, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Office of Inspector General (NRC OIG), and the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB). DNFSB is responsible for providing independent oversight of the Department of Energy’s (DOE) public health and safety protections at its sites. As shown below, GAO found that DNFSB had fully addressed 36 of the recommendations and partially addressed the remaining five. DNFSB’s actions have generally helped enhance collaboration with stakeholders, improve procedures, and improve employee morale. GAO, NRC OIG, and NAPA made these recommendations in response to shortcomings they identified in DNFSB’s management that resulted in a dysfunctional organizational culture and performance problems. These assessments described a deterioration in DNFSB’s planning and effectiveness that was largely driven by the divisive and dysfunctional relationships among the agency’s Board members. The resulting recommendations generally focused on cultivating DNFSB’s ability to enhance collaboration with stakeholders, improve planning and procedures, and improve employee morale. Status of Independent Entities’ Recommendations to DNFSB and Actions Taken to Address Them GAO found that DNFSB has not fully addressed five recommendations that NAPA made in 2018. These included recommendations to improve its human capital planning and to refresh the Board’s membership. GAO found that DNFSB developed its first human capital plan in late 2024, but the plan does not include implementation details on what is to be achieved, who is to achieve it, how it will be achieved, and by when. Because DNFSB’s primary resource is its people, ensuring that employee roles in supporting the agency’s mission are well defined will help ensure the most efficient and effective use of budget and the best mission outcomes. A more actionable future iteration of the plan that details how DNFSB can progress toward stated goals would help the agency to more effectively navigate unplanned agency pivots with minimal disruption to agency mission. In addition to improving human capital planning, GAO found that filling empty Board seats remains challenging for DNFSB because the five members of the Board must be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. In January 2025, the Board fell to two members, which resulted in a loss of quorum for the second time in the last 2 years and in the agency’s history. According to DNFSB officials, a Board below quorum poses a substantial risk to the agency’s ability to execute its mission of providing independent safety oversight of the DOE’s processes that could cause nuclear accidents. In October 2025, the Board could fall to one member and consequently lose its ability to issue recommendations or hold hearings on critical nuclear safety issues. DNFSB officials said that not having a full five-member Board to deliberate on and support the agency’s findings may also lead DOE to take DNFSB’s technical correspondences less seriously. Current Board members and officials said that they have communicated these concerns to the White House and Congress. Why GAO Did This Study DNFSB is the only federal agency that provides independent oversight of whether DOE’s public health and safety protections are adequate at the approximately 100 defense nuclear facilities across 10 active DOE sites in the United States. Defense nuclear facilities are defined as being under the control or jurisdiction of the Secretary of Energy and include production or utilization facilities operated for national security purposes or nuclear waste storage facilities. DNFSB’s ability to work as an independent oversight body is central to preventing high-consequence (but typically low-probability) threats to communities and the environment by, for example, providing oversight over processes that could cause nuclear accidents. Senate Report No. 118-188 includes a provision for GAO to conduct a general management review of the DNFSB with a focus on whether past findings from independent assessments have been addressed. This report addresses (1) how DNFSB has responded to recommendations from past independent assessments and (2) what recommendations remain challenging for DNFSB to implement. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed and assessed the status of recommendations from GAO, NRC OIG, and NAPA. GAO also interviewed officials from DNFSB, including Board members, officials from NRC OIG, and representatives from NAPA.

What GAO Found The Secretary of the Army (Army) is the single manager for conventional ammunition for the Department of Defense (DOD). Conventional ammunition includes items ranging from small arms cartridges to rockets, mortars, and artillery shells. GAO focused its audit on Army ammunition held for repair and managed at contractor-owned, contractor-operated (COCO) sites. Of the approximately $41 billion in ammunitions the Army reported in its financial statement as of September 30, 2024, $966 million of it was held at COCO sites. The Army uses the Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) system to account for ammunition inventory held at these sites. GAO found that the Army did not accurately record ammunition inventory information in its financial accounting records. For example, the Army did not have accurate information about which COCO sites held ammunition inventory during GAO’s audit. Further, based on the sample testing results, GAO estimated that the Army did not properly record in the LMP system approximately 95 percent of the selected records as of July 31, 2024. Specifically, GAO tested 94 Army ammunition records held at three COCO sites and found that the Army did not properly record 89 of the selected records, as shown below. Accuracy of 94 Selected Army Ammunition Records as of July 31, 2024 The Army did not properly account for COCO-held ammunition because it lacked a process and related guidance for recording and reporting ammunition inventory at COCO sites. The Army has taken some steps to document the reconciliation of Army ammunition held for repair at COCO sites. However, the actions the Army has taken do not address all the weaknesses GAO identified in its review. In addition, the Army lacks key guidance to help ensure that it accurately and timely records ammunition inventory transactions in its financial accounting records and retains supporting documentation for ammunition inventory transactions. Until corrected, these deficiencies increase the risk that the Army’s accounting records for ammunition inventory are inaccurate. Further, inconsistently performing, or not performing, ammunition inventory reconciliations increases the risk of management and Congress lacking reliable ammunition accounting information needed to make informed decisions regarding Army’s resources. Why GAO Did This Study DOD remains the only major federal agency to have never received a department-wide clean audit opinion. One contributing factor is DOD’s long-standing material weakness in operating material and supplies (OM&S). During the fiscal year 2024 audit of the Army’s financial statement, the independent public accountants reported that the Army did not consistently design, implement, and document internal controls over all aspects of OM&S. Having accurate financial accounting records is an important, basic tool in the management and oversight of organizations. The Army accounts for ammunition, spare parts, and repair parts in its OM&S account. This report, developed in connection with fulfilling GAO’s mandate to audit the U.S. government’s consolidated financial statements, examines the extent to which the Army properly accounted for ammunition inventory managed and held for repair at COCO sites in its financial accounting records. To do this, GAO reviewed relevant DOD guidance and instructions. GAO also reviewed a random sample of 94 records from the Army’s LMP system for ammunition inventory held for repair at three COCO sites as of July 31, 2024.

What GAO Found The federal cyber workforce consists of federal employees and contractors who perform IT, cybersecurity, and cyber-related functions. Federal guidance from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and Office of Personnel Management (OPM) call for having quality workforce data at the agency-level. In its 2023 cyber workforce strategy, the Office of the National Cyber Director (ONCD) also emphasized the importance of high-quality data for workforce management. However, most agencies did not have quality information on their component-level and contractor cyber workforce. As a result, they could not accurately identify the size and cost of their cyber workforce. Using information readily available to agency-level offices, agencies reported at least 63,934 federal and 4,151 contractor staff at an annual cost of at least $9.3 billion and $5.2 billion, respectively, as of April 2024. However, these amounts are incomplete and unreliable and do not reflect the full size and cost of the cyber workforce. A significant gap is that 22 of the 23 agencies reported partial or no data on their contractor cyber workforce. Further, 19 of 23 agencies did not have a documented quality assurance process to ensure accurate data. Also, 17 of 23 agencies lacked standardized procedures for identifying cyber employees. Until ONCD addresses these factors, it cannot ensure that agencies will have the information needed to support workforce decisions. This is especially important during administration transitions when new leadership needs assurance that the federal government is prepared and cyber-ready. Twenty-two of the 23 agencies reported using various initiatives to help strengthen their federal cyber workforce through hiring/recruiting, reskilling/training, and retention efforts (see figure). Total Number of Federal Cyber Workforce Initiatives Agencies Reported Using However, agencies did not evaluate the effectiveness of most of these initiatives. Nine agencies evaluated aspects of costs, benefits, and performance while five agencies used assessments to justify expanding some of their initiatives. Agencies did not always evaluate effectiveness due, in part, to the lack of visibility into data to support such assessments. Further, ONCD's cyber workforce strategy did not call for such evaluations. Improved insight into the effectiveness of specific initiatives would help ONCD and agencies prioritize those providing the greatest return on investment. Why GAO Did This Study A resilient and skilled cyber workforce is essential to protecting government IT infrastructure from cyber threats and risks. ONCD's July 2023 National Cyber Workforce and Education Strategy recognized the importance of strengthening the federal cyber workforce. GAO has previously reported on needed improvements in managing the cyber workforce. Since 2019 it has made 64 recommendations to address cyber workforce issues; 32 of these are not yet fully implemented. GAO was asked to review agencies' efforts to manage their cyber workforce. This report assesses whether federal civilian departments and agencies (agencies) (1) used quality data to identify the size and cost of their federal and contractor cyber workforce and (2) followed federal guidance to evaluate existing cyber workforce initiatives. GAO analyzed documentation such as cyber workforce metrics and related assessments for 23 agencies. GAO then compared this documentation to guidance from OMB and OPM on agencies (1) using quality data to support strategic workforce planning and (2) evaluating the effectiveness of initiatives. GAO also interviewed key officials from agencies, OMB, and ONCD on cyber workforce data quality, initiatives, and related assessments.

What GAO Found The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), has worked to reduce the effect of mental illness and substance use disorders—collectively referred to as behavioral health conditions. A behavioral health crisis, which can happen to anyone, puts an individual at risk of hurting themselves or others. Crisis response services can reduce the risk of immediate harm and help prevent future crises by providing access to behavioral health providers. GAO found that from 2020 through May 2025, SAMHSA provided resources—guidance, funding, and technical assistance—to states and others, such as behavioral health clinics, to support crisis response services. For example, Guidance. SAMHSA issued guidance outlining best practices for providing crisis response services. In it, SAMHSA described the importance of offering a range of services across a continuum of care, which includes (1) someone to contact—contact centers, (2) someone to respond—mobile crisis teams, and (3) a safe place for help—crisis stabilization. Funding. GAO found that SAMHSA provided over $1.3 billion through 10 programs in fiscal years 2021 through 2024 to support states and others in developing and providing crisis response services. Five programs supported the 2022 launch of the 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline—an easy-to-remember phone number that links those in crisis to a counselor. Other programs provided funding to support mobile crisis teams that provide in-person treatment and assessment. Technical assistance. SAMHSA offered trainings, expert panels, and other assistance to help states enhance their crisis response services. The five selected states in GAO's review used SAMHSA resources to support behavioral health crisis response services in a variety of ways across the continuum of care through May 2025. For example, officials from all five states said they used SAMHSA funding to hire staff to increase responsiveness to individuals in crisis. Others invested in infrastructure such as by building data-sharing platforms to help improve care coordination, according to state officials. Examples of Selected States' Use of Federal Resources to Enhance Behavioral Health Crisis Response Services Across the Continuum of Care Note: For more details, see fig. 2 in GAO-25-107586. Why GAO Did This Study Behavioral health conditions affect millions of Americans, and these numbers continue to grow. GAO has reported on multiple nationwide behavioral health issues, including longstanding shortages in the behavioral health provider workforce. Delays in accessing behavioral health care have been common and may increase the risk that an individual experiences a crisis. SAMHSA has provided resources, such as funding, to states and others to enhance behavioral health services, including crisis response services. In March 2025, HHS announced that it would consolidate SAMHSA into a new Administration for a Healthy America. As of August 25, 2025, this transition had not yet occurred. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, includes a provision for GAO to review SAMHSA's behavioral health crisis response programs. Among other things, this report describes SAMHSA's behavioral health crisis response efforts and how selected states used SAMHSA resources to support their crisis response activities through May 2025. GAO reviewed SAMHSA data and documentation from 2020 through May 2025, and interviewed agency officials. GAO also reviewed documentation and interviewed behavioral health department officials from five states. These states—Arizona, Georgia, Oklahoma, Virginia, and Washington—were selected to reflect geographic variation among those with a high capacity to respond to crisis response needs in their state. For more information, contact Alyssa M. Hundrup at HundrupA@gao.gov.

What GAO Found Department of Defense (DOD) components submitted unfunded priorities to Congress totaling $134 billion from fiscal year 2020 through fiscal year 2025, an increase of 73 percent over the time frame when adjusted for inflation, according to GAO's analysis. These DOD components include the military services, the combatant commands, the National Guard Bureau and the Missile Defense Agency. For example, during the 6-year period, the military services identified $91.8 billion, which comprised 69 percent of the total amount for unfunded priorities. Of that, the Navy identified the most funding overall, $27 billion, largely for aircraft procurement and ship building. In fiscal year 2025, combatant commands identified the most for unfunded priorities, with U.S. Indo-Pacific Command having the largest amount of $11 billion. Amounts Submitted for Unfunded Priorities by DOD Component Type, Fiscal Years 2020–2025 Note: The other components from DOD include the National Guard Bureau and the Missile Defense Agency. Amounts are not adjusted for inflation. Selected DOD components inconsistently addressed required statutory reporting elements and used different methodologies to prioritize and report their fiscal year 2025 submissions for unfunded priorities, according to GAO analysis. Six of the 11 DOD components GAO reviewed addressed all required statutory elements in their submissions to Congress. However, five did not do so, leaving out information on appropriation accounts and the reason why the recommended funding was not in the President's budget request. GAO also found the statute is unclear on how unfunded priorities should be prioritized, which led to variation in the submissions reviewed. Without revising the statute to clarify how DOD should prioritize and report unfunded priorities to Congress, and without DOD components addressing all statutory elements, Congress may not have critical input to make informed funding decisions when assessing how to best address DOD's readiness and warfighter needs for the fiscal year. Why GAO Did This Study Specific DOD components are required by law to annually submit lists of unfunded priorities to Congress within 10 days of release of the President's budget request. Unfunded priority lists include billions of dollars' worth of additional military needs not included in the President's budget request, such as aircraft and military construction. Senate Report 118-58 included a provision for GAO to review how specific DOD components develop unfunded priority lists. This report examines how amounts for unfunded priorities changed over time and the extent to which selected DOD components addressed statutory elements in the fiscal year 2025 submissions for unfunded priorities, among other objectives. GAO reviewed the 87 unfunded priority lists submitted to Congress between fiscal years 2020 and 2025 by all 18 DOD components required to do so. GAO also reviewed associated budget documentation. GAO selected a mix of 11 DOD components, varying by type, to assess whether their respective fiscal year 2025 unfunded priority lists addressed statutory elements.

What GAO Found The Department of Defense Education Activity (DODEA) adopted goals of having a workforce in which no less than 12 percent of employees are people with disabilities and 2 percent are people with targeted disabilities. Targeted disabilities include traumatic brain injuries, deafness, blindness, and partial or complete paralysis, among others. In fiscal year 2024, the agency did not meet its disability employment goals. About 900 DODEA employees had disabilities (6.06 percent), and almost 160 had targeted disabilities (1.07 percent), according to the agency's fiscal year 2024 data. DODEA officials told GAO the agency uses a range of efforts to support and increase employment for people with disabilities across different stages of their careers. For example, agency officials said they attend recruiting events targeted to veterans with disabilities. DODEA uses special appointment authorities to increase hiring of people with disabilities who meet eligibility requirements, according to agency officials. Officials also said that providing reasonable accommodations helps the agency retain and advance employees with disabilities. According to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, a reasonable accommodation is a change in the way things are normally done, such as an accessible workstation, that allows an individual with a disability to apply for a job, do a job, or enjoy equal access to the benefits and privileges of employment. Why GAO Did This Study DODEA employs teachers and a range of support staff to provide educational services in schools it operates around the world for the dependents of military service members and civilian Department of Defense (DOD) employees. In fiscal year 2024, DODEA employed more than 14,000 people. DODEA supports the employment of individuals with disabilities through the joint effort of the agency's Human Resources Division and Equal Employment Opportunity Programs Division. Federal law and regulations require covered federal agencies, including DOD, to promote equal employment opportunity to qualified people with disabilities with respect to federal employment. Agencies must develop plans for hiring, placement, and advancement of people with disabilities, and the plans must require the agency to adopt procedures for providing reasonable accommodations. As part of these plans, agencies must commit to the goal of having a workforce in which no less than 12 percent of employees are people with disabilities and at least 2 percent are people with targeted disabilities. The Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 includes a provision for GAO to review DODEA's employment of people with disabilities. This report provides information about whether the agency is meeting its goals, and how it supports the employment, retention, and career advancement of people with intellectual, physical, and developmental disabilities. For more information, contact Elizabeth Curda at CurdaE@gao.gov.

What GAO Found The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) started a human resources IT (HRIT) portfolio (a collection of related IT projects) initiative in 2003 to modernize systems. According to the Department's Inspector General, by 2010 DHS had made limited progress on the initiative. In 2010, the DHS Deputy Secretary announced that the department could no longer sustain a component-based approach for human resource IT. Accordingly, in 2011 DHS announced 15 program goals; most goals were aimed at delivering enterprise-wide solutions. After nine years of effort from 2011 to 2020 that resulted in not meeting 12 of the 15 goals, DHS refined and replaced the goals with five different goals. However, it discontinued use of those goals in 2022 and further refined and replaced HRIT's goals with two new draft goals. As of April 2025, these goals remain in draft status. Between 2005 and 2023, GAO estimates that, based on available data, DHS has spent at least $262 million on this initiative. The lack of progress in achieving its goals is due in part to gaps in DHS's implementation of six key portfolio management practice areas (see table below). For example, DHS does not have an approved strategy and goals, and lacks cost data for 28 of 49 projects, which prevents fully measuring portfolio performance. DHS's Human Resources IT Implementation of Portfolio Management Practices Portfolio management practice area GAO rating Strategic management (e.g. developing a strategic plan) ◑ Governance (e.g. developing a portfolio governance board) ◑ Capacity and capability management (e.g. allocating resources) ◑ Stakeholder engagement (e.g. implementing a stakeholder engagement plan) ◑ Performance management (e.g. measuring performance against metrics) ○ Risk management (e.g. utilizing a risk register to track portfolio risks) ◑ Legend: ●=Fully implemented ◑=Partially implemented ○=Not implemented Source: GAO analysis of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) human resources IT portfolio documentation against practices defined in Project Management Institute, Inc., The Standard for Portfolio Management – Fourth Edition (Newton Square, PA: 2017). | GAO‑25‑107233 According to DHS officials, they are experiencing two challenges in overseeing federal shared service providers, such as the U.S. Department of Agriculture—a provider of payroll, personnel actions, and time and attendance services to DHS. DHS has had difficulties in ensuring Agriculture is adhering to federal cybersecurity requirements. Although DHS and others have reported significant cybersecurity concerns with Agriculture systems, they have not been successful in obtaining requested documents from Agriculture. According to DHS officials, they need these documents to comply with their cybersecurity responsibilities under federal requirements and guidance. In November 2024, Agriculture finalized a plan to modernize two critical aging mainframe systems that are essential to DHS. However, according to officials, that plan is now on hold as new leadership assesses whether the effort will continue. Why GAO Did This Study Since DHS was created in 2002 and merged 22 agencies into one department, its human resources environment has included duplicative systems and paper-based processes. DHS initiated its human resources IT portfolio initiative in 2003 to consolidate and modernize the department's human resources systems. GAO was asked to provide an update on DHS's progress in implementing the portfolio initiative. GAO's objectives were to, among other things, (1) identify progress in achieving goals, (2) evaluate the extent to which DHS implemented portfolio management practices, and (3) identify any challenges in overseeing shared service providers. GAO reviewed project documentation to determine actions taken relative to goals; evaluated HRIT portfolio documentation against best practices for portfolio management; compared DHS actions to address their identified challenges to federal requirements; reviewed documents from a key shared service provider (Agriculture) and compared them to federal requirements; and conducted interviews.

What GAO Found The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) relies on contracted examiners to provide most medical exams for veterans filing disability claims. VA’s Medical Disability Examination Office (MDEO) oversees contracted exams. MDEO uses exam error data to identify quality concerns but miscalculated certain payments intended to incentivize high-quality exams. Error data. Each quarter, MDEO uses data on contracted exam errors to identify trends and improve exam quality. For instance, MDEO provides contractors with information on the exam types more likely to lead to errors, which contractors use to develop an action plan to prevent these exam errors. Financial incentives. MDEO also uses its exam error data to calculate financial incentives (rewards and penalties) based on contractor performance. However, it does not have written procedures for verifying the accuracy of these calculations. As a result, MDEO incorrectly paid over $2 million in incentives in the first quarter of fiscal year 2024 (see figure). Until MDEO develops and uses procedures to validate these calculations, it risks wasting funds on incorrect payments. Incentives Paid for Contracted Disability Exams, Fiscal Year 2024, Quarter 1 MDEO uses other key information, such as Special Focused Review findings and stakeholder feedback, to improve exam quality—but its efforts are incomplete. Special Focused Reviews. MDEO uses Special Focused Reviews to address exam quality issues. However, MDEO has not met its schedule for reviewing exams for complex claims (i.e., traumatic brain injury, military sexual trauma, and Gulf War Illness), which are more likely to result in errors. Reviews for each complex claim type are either overdue--by 9 months as of July 2025--or not yet scheduled, contrary to MDEO procedures that reviews happen every other year. This schedule helps MDEO monitor changes in exam quality and assess the effect of prior recommendations. Completing the reviews as scheduled would improve MDEO’s ability to oversee the quality of these higher-risk exams. Stakeholder feedback. MDEO collects feedback on exam quality directly from stakeholders, such as veterans and contractor officials, but not from examiners. MDEO relies on contractors to relay examiner feedback, but contractors said they rarely elevate this feedback to MDEO. Further, examiners said there are issues that they would prefer to raise directly to MDEO because of conflicting or unhelpful responses from the contractors. Collecting feedback directly from examiners could improve MDEO’s awareness of potential quality challenges and help improve decisions on disability claims. Why GAO Did This Study Disability exams are a critical source of evidence for determining veterans’ eligibility for compensation for service-connected disabilities. In fiscal year 2024, contractors conducted over 3 million disability exams at a cost of over $5 billion, according to MDEO officials. GAO was asked to review MDEO’s oversight of contracted exams. This report examines the extent to which MDEO uses exam data and other key information to improve exam quality. GAO reviewed MDEO documents, such as policies and reports, and the most recent MDEO data on financial incentive calculations (April 2023 through September 2024). GAO compared MDEO’s efforts to MDEO procedures, GAO practices for evidence-based decision making, and federal standards for internal control. Additionally, GAO held two discussion groups with claims processors selected for variation in location and duties and grouped by years of experience. GAO also interviewed MDEO officials and six examiners selected for variation in the contractors they worked for, medical specialty, and years of experience.

What GAO Found The Department of Defense (DOD) can use a contracting mechanism known as an “other transaction agreement,” or OTA, to develop prototypes. Rather than using standardized federal acquisition terms and conditions, OTAs rely on DOD contracting officials to customize the terms and conditions they deem necessary to protect the government’s interests. This flexibility may help DOD attract nontraditional defense contractors that otherwise may not choose to contract with DOD. However, this flexibility could also increase risk, such as by reducing oversight of contractors’ costs. After DOD successfully develops a prototype, it may produce it on a larger scale by awarding either (1) another OTA—known as a production OTA, or (2) a standard contract, which is subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation. In fiscal year 2024, DOD’s prototype OTA obligations totaled over $16 billion. However, DOD does not know the extent to which these prototype OTAs directly resulted in production awards. DOD systematically tracks production OTAs, reporting $2 billion in production OTA use in fiscal year 2024. However, DOD does not similarly track standard contracts for production that resulted from prototype OTAs. Without a systematic process to track these data, DOD cannot assess the extent to which OTAs are delivering capabilities to the warfighter. Depiction of the Transition of Prototype Other Transaction Agreements (OTA) into Production, as of June 2025 Ten of GAO’s 18 selected weapon systems that used prototype OTAs planned to switch to standard contracts for production. DOD officials said that while they saw benefits of OTA flexibilities during the prototyping phase, such as collaboratively working with contractors on the statements of work, they used standard contracts during the production phase to help mitigate risks. For example, officials said that standard contracts can help increase DOD’s insight into contractor costs and reduce the risk of overpayment. Moreover, DOD officials told GAO that like any procurement approach, OTAs offer different advantages and disadvantages, and do not ensure successful outcomes. DOD officials added that a well-written OTA cannot compensate for a poorly planned acquisition. DOD officials stated they are collecting lessons learned associated with transitioning prototype OTAs into production. Why GAO Did This Study DOD obligations through OTAs for prototyping and production have significantly increased, growing from $1.8 billion in fiscal year 2016 to over $18 billion in fiscal year 2024. The current administration has also encouraged the use of OTAs, particularly for defense acquisitions. Prior GAO and DOD Inspector General reports found that data challenges limited DOD’s visibility into the use of OTAs, including the extent to which nontraditional defense contractors were participating. A Conference report includes a provision for GAO to review DOD’s use of OTAs. GAO’s report examines (1) the extent to which DOD used prototype OTAs and the data it collects to determine their effectiveness, and (2) how selected DOD weapon system development efforts using prototype OTAs planned to transition into production. To do this work, GAO analyzed OTA data from fiscal years 2021 through 2024 and compared these data against DOD’s reports to Congress. GAO reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of 18 weapon systems using prototype OTAs. GAO selected the sample from two DOD components that accounted for a majority of OTA use, based on GAO’s annual assessments of DOD’s major weapon systems. GAO also interviewed contracting officials from DOD components.

What GAO Found After years of cost growth and schedule delays in its hardware and software modernization effort for the F-35 aircraft, known as Block 4, the Department of Defense (DOD) is in the process of establishing a new major subprogram to help meet cost, schedule, and performance goals. Currently, Block 4 costs are over $6 billion more and completion is at least 5 years later than original estimates. The program plans to reduce the scope of Block 4 to deliver capabilities to the warfighter at a more predictable pace than in the past. Contractors for the program, Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney, continued delivering aircraft and engines late. For instance, in 2024, Lockheed delivered 110 aircraft. All were late by an average of 238 days, up from 61 days in 2023. F-35 Aircraft Delivered Late by the Contractor, Calendar Years 2023–2024 Lockheed Martin’s Technology Refresh 3 (TR-3)—a $1.9-billion suite of hardware and software upgrades that are critical to the Block 4 modernization effort—was the primary driver of late aircraft deliveries in 2024. Evaluating Lockheed Martin’s capacity to deliver aircraft on time would help determine how many aircraft the program should plan to purchase. In recent years, the program paid contractors, such as Lockheed Martin, hundreds of millions of dollars in incentive fees that were intended to improve on-time delivery. However, the structure of on-time delivery incentives allowed the contractor to deliver aircraft up to 60 days late and still earn some of the fee. To avoid rewarding late deliveries, the program should reevaluate its use of fees in future contracts and better align them to achieve desired production outcomes. As it stands up new modernization subprograms, the F-35 program has opportunities to deliver capabilities faster. GAO’s work on leading practices for product development has found that leading companies employ an iterative process of design, validation, and production to quickly develop and deliver products. While the program is implementing some aspects of these practices, it would benefit from expanding the use of modern design tools, such as digital models that developers can test in a simulated environment, to more rapidly deliver capabilities to the warfighter than it has historically. Why GAO Did This Study The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter plays a crucial role in national security for the U.S. and its partners and allies. The aircraft’s unique stealth technology and advanced sensor networking systems provide critical capabilities to DOD’s tactical air portfolio. DOD estimates that Block 4 and engine and power thermal management modernization—as well as the costs to maintain and operate the 2,470 planned aircraft over the 77-year life cycle—will exceed $2 trillion. Congress included a provision in statute for GAO to review the F-35 program. This report assesses, among other things, (1) DOD’s progress in Block 4 modernization efforts; (2) the extent to which contractors delivered F-35 engines and aircraft within contract time frames and earned related incentives; and (3) the program’s use of leading practices for product development. GAO conducted site visits to contractor facilities; collected and analyzed cost, schedule, and production data; reviewed relevant program documentation; and interviewed DOD officials and contractor representatives.

What GAO Found The underlying principles of the Federal Wage System (FWS) are to set hourly pay rates for federal blue-collar workers in line with local prevailing (or market) rates and provide equal pay for substantially equal work. However, these principles have not been met because of several challenges with the FWS. These challenges include: effect of the pay adjustment cap on final FWS wage rates and wage schedules; inexact match between local wage survey job descriptions used to compare federal FWS and private sector occupations; and amount of private sector wage data collected for local wage surveys. In addition, officials from most selected Department of Defense (DOD) services—Air Force, Army, and Navy—and installations—Edwards Air Force Base, Tobyhanna Army Depot, and Norfolk Naval Shipyard—reported challenges with recruiting and retaining FWS employees, such as competition with the private sector for skilled labor and the lengthy federal onboarding process. All selected DOD services and installations took actions to address recruitment and retention challenges, including the use of various pay flexibilities, for certain FWS employees. Selected Services' and Installations' Use of Pay Flexibilities to Recruit and Retain Federal Wage System Employees, Fiscal Years 2018–2024 Note: For more details, see figure 5 in GAO-25-107152. GAO found the selected installations have or are developing goals for the FWS workforce. Norfolk Naval Shipyard and Tobyhanna Army Depot used measurable targets for determining their FWS workload needs. However, Edwards Air Force Base did not have measurable targets for recruiting and retaining its FWS workforce. Establishing measurable targets will help Edwards Air Force Base better assess the results of specific actions and strategies taken to improve FWS recruitment and retention and effectively manage its workforce to meet its mission. Why GAO Did This Study DOD relies on its blue-collar workforce to perform and support a variety of work. GAO's prior work found that DOD has faced long-standing workforce challenges in competing with the private sector and other federal agencies for skilled workers. The Joint Explanatory Statement for the James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 includes a provision for GAO to report on the FWS. This report examines (1) challenges in administering the FWS that may affect recruitment and retention at selected DOD services and installations, and (2) the extent to which selected DOD services and installations have taken actions to address FWS recruitment and retention challenges. GAO selected the services and installations based on factors, such as the size of the FWS workforce, the presence of different types of FWS employees, and geographic dispersion. GAO analyzed DOD data from fiscal years 2018 through 2024 to identify workforce trends; analyzed agency documents; and interviewed agency and union officials. GAO conducted site visits to Edwards Air Force Base, Tobyhanna Army Depot, and Norfolk Naval Shipyard. GAO compared the services' and installations' use of goals and targets for the FWS workforce to GAO's performance management practices.

What GAO Found Between 2019 and 2024, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—experienced a significant increase in the number of individuals apprehended by U.S. Border Patrol along the southwest border. To address this issue, CBP used temporary soft-sided facilities—steel-framed tent-like structures—to provide additional capacity for processing and holding people in its custody. Because they are temporary, the number of facilities can change due to trends in the number of people apprehended. In September 2024, CBP had seven soft-sided facilities with different capacities—from 983 to 2,500. In March 2025, CBP ceased operating these facilities due to a significant drop in apprehensions. Aerial and Interior Views of Soft-Sided Facilities Used by U.S. Customs and Border Protection CBP obligated over $4 billion total from 2019 through 2024 for soft-sided facilities and related services. But CBP engaged in limited acquisition planning to inform its investments in these facilities. For example, CBP did not take steps to accurately determine the number of contractor staff it needed to operate those facilities. As a result, some locations had either too few or too many staff. While CBP is not currently operating soft-sides facilities, it is likely to do so in the future if there are future surges in apprehensions, according to officials. Thus, CBP has an opportunity to identify and document lessons learned to better inform future investment decisions for these facilities. In fiscal year 2022, Congress appropriated $330 million to DHS to develop and construct Joint Processing Centers. DHS plans to build and operate up to five of these facilities along the southwest border, which GAO estimates could cost roughly $7 billion. While DHS engaged in some initial planning to acquire Joint Processing Centers, officials did not complete key acquisition planning and oversight steps that leading practices suggest are key to inform large-dollar investments. For example, DHS began construction on the Laredo, Texas Joint Processing Center in October 2024 without reliable and complete operations and cost information. Further, it has not fully documented requirements and criteria for determining its Joint Processing Center locations. Documenting its process for identifying future Joint Processing Center locations and completing a life-cycle cost estimate would ensure that DHS is managing billions of dollars of mission critical services efficiently and effectively. Why GAO Did This Study CBP relied on contracts to operate and maintain soft-sided facilities (SSF). These facilities provide support and services when additional processing and holding capacity is needed for individuals apprehended along the southwest border. DHS also received funding to construct Joint Processing Centers (JPC)—permanent facilities that DHS expects will be more cost-effective than SSFs in the future. GAO was asked to review CBP's and DHS's use and oversight of SSFs and JPCs. This report examines, among other things, (1) how CBP used contracts to support its SSF needs, and (2) the extent to which CBP and DHS engaged in planning efforts for SSF and JPC related acquisitions. GAO analyzed contracting data on SSF contract obligations for fiscal years 2019-2024, and reviewed DHS budget plans, acquisition policies, and cost estimates for SSFs and JPCs. GAO also visited four selected SSF locations in Yuma and Tucson, AZ, El Paso, TX, and San Diego, CA based in part on apprehension and cost data; reviewed a nongeneralizable sample of eight of 69 contracts for SSFs and JPC construction contract documents; and interviewed DHS and CBP officials.

What GAO Found Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components—primarily U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Homeland Security Investigations (HSI)—led or assisted on the seizure of almost 460,000 pounds of fentanyl and chemicals used to make fentanyl (precursors) and 10,000 pieces of equipment used to make fentanyl pills (production equipment) from fiscal years (FY) 2021 through 2024. DHS conducts various efforts to combat the trafficking of fentanyl, its precursor chemicals, and production equipment into the U.S. through CBP and HSI. Specifically, CBP inspects incoming travelers and shipments and patrols and surveils the border; and HSI investigates bad actors and transnational criminal organizations. CBP and HSI also conduct special operations to disrupt fentanyl-related supply chains and collaborate with federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement partners. Department of Homeland Security Component Efforts and Tools to Combat Fentanyl Trafficking DHS analyzes and reports data on its efforts to combat fentanyl trafficking, but its ability to fully assess the effectiveness of its efforts is limited. This is because it has not established a statutorily required program and incorporated key performance management practices. Specifically, DHS has not established a program to collect data and develop measures to assess the effectiveness of efforts to combat the trafficking of illicit fentanyl, including synthetic opioids with chemical structures related to fentanyl (analogues) and precursor chemicals, into the U.S., as required by law. DHS tasked CBP with establishing the program, but CBP does not have access to the information it needs to do so, such as other components' data and measures. By establishing the required program, DHS would be better positioned to assess the effectiveness of its efforts. Additionally, DHS has not developed performance goals and measures related to its strategic goals for its efforts to combat fentanyl trafficking. By developing performance goals for its strategic goals as well as measures for those performance goals, which could be established through the statutorily required program, DHS would be better positioned to assess progress toward achieving its long-term goals. Why GAO Did This Study DHS is responsible for securing the nation's borders against the trafficking of drugs. This includes illicit fentanyl, which continues to be the primary cause of overdose deaths in the U.S. The James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2023 requires DHS to, among other things, establish a program to collect data and develop measures to assess the effectiveness of efforts to detect and deter illicit fentanyl, including its analogues and precursor chemicals, from being trafficked into the U.S. The Act includes a provision for GAO to review the data collected and measures developed by DHS's program. This report examines (1) DHS data on seizures of illicit fentanyl, its precursor chemicals, and production equipment from FY 2021 through 2024; (2) DHS efforts to combat the trafficking of these items into the U.S.; and (3) the extent DHS has assessed the effectiveness of its efforts. GAO analyzed DHS, CBP, and HSI documents and data on fentanyl-related seizures and investigations for FY 2021 through 2024. GAO also interviewed DHS, CBP, and HSI officials, including CBP and HSI field officials during visits to four locations.

Why This Matters Tornadoes claim more lives annually in the U.S. than hurricanes and earthquakes combined. In 2024, there were more than 2,100 tornadoes in the U.S., the highest annual total on record dating back to 1950. FEMA helps tornado survivors and communities through a variety of programs. GAO Key Takeaways The President approved 94 major disaster declarations involving tornadoes, in fiscal years 2019 through 2024. For those disasters, FEMA has obligated $2.8 billion for Public Assistance and the Individuals and Households Program, as of December 2024. FEMA also assists tribal, state, local, and territorial governments through its Emergency Management Performance Grant program. This program is the primary source of federal support for developing and maintaining emergency management expertise. It pays for salaries and provides resources related to hazard preparation. Per statute, only states and territories are eligible to receive Emergency Management Performance Grant awards directly from FEMA; Tribes are not eligible to apply directly. States may distribute grant awards to local governments and Tribes. From fiscal years 2014 through 2023, 17 states did not distribute any awards to Tribes within their state. When communities cannot access assistance to build emergency management capacity, it could mean not being able to plan and prepare for a disaster, such as a tornado. In April 2023, FEMA submitted a legislative proposal to Congress outlining several possible solutions that would enable tribes to more easily access this funding. Congress has not yet acted on FEMA’s legislative proposal, as of August 2025. A Home in Nebraska Damaged by A Tornado in April 2024 How GAO Did This Study We analyzed FEMA data on tornado disasters from 2019 through 2024. We also visited four states, and interviewed emergency management officials from seven counties and two Tribes impacted by tornadoes during that span.

What GAO Found The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has a policy encouraging purchasers of common goods and services to leverage the government’s buying power and save taxpayer dollars. In 2020, VA assigned roles and responsibilities to implement an effort led by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), called category management, designed to help federal agencies buy like a single enterprise. VA assigned officials to manage 10 common spending categories, such as medical and IT goods and services. Each category manager was also tasked with implementing five key responsibilities aligned with OMB guidance. GAO found, however, that these officials and those assisting them—known as category leads—generally did not fulfill their responsibilities because senior leaders responsible for oversight did not take steps to ensure they did so. Until senior VA leaders hold these officials accountable, VA will struggle to consistently implement its category management policy and take important steps that could result in savings, reduced contract duplication, or other benefits. Extent to Which Department of Veterans Affairs Category Management Leadership Met Key Responsibilities in Policy, as of February 2025 VA met most of its annual category management goals set by OMB from fiscal years 2020 to 2024. For example, 91.7 percent of VA’s $67.2 billion in contract obligations in fiscal year 2024 were on contracts considered to be managed according to category management principles, exceeding its goal of 90 percent. VA reported savings for governmentwide contracts that accounted for 7.6 percent of its fiscal year 2024 contract obligations. However, category leads told GAO that they did not set or manage toward category-specific savings goals. Doing so could help VA leverage its buying power to save taxpayer dollars and quantify the return on investment for a larger share of its category management efforts. VA met annual goals set by OMB for training its workforce on category management principles. However, GAO found that key officials, including leads for seven of 10 spending categories, had not taken such training. Until VA ensures that key officials—including category managers and category leads—receive training that is relevant for their roles, the agency will struggle to fully implement its category management policy. Why GAO Did This Study According to the General Services Administration, the government achieved $58.3 billion in cost avoidance through OMB’s category management initiative from fiscal years 2021 through 2024. VA reportedly accounted for $14.3 billion of this amount. The government’s pursuit of additional savings and efficiency remains critical in the face of increasing budgetary pressures. GAO was asked to review VA’s progress in implementing category management. Among other objectives, this report identifies the extent to which VA (1) implemented category management policies and processes, and (2) achieved intended category management outcomes. GAO reviewed VA policies, procedures, and plans, and OMB’s category management guidance; analyzed VA contract and category management data between fiscal years 2019 and 2024 and assessed progress against established goals; and interviewed VA officials, including those responsible for managing VA’s 10 common spending categories and VA contracting activities.

Why This Matters Tribes can get important economic benefits from energy projects on their lands, such as revenue for government operations. The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Tribal Energy Financing Program (TEFP) offers loans and loan guarantees for such projects. However, Tribes may be experiencing barriers to participation, which could limit development of untapped energy resources on tribal lands. GAO Key Takeaways Since its first solicitation in 2018, TEFP has received 20 applications for loans and loan guarantees for various project types and amounts. Requests ranged from $23.7 million for a solar project to $8.7 billion for an ammonia production facility for low-carbon fuel. DOE’s Loan Programs Office, which manages TEFP, has closed one loan guarantee and no loans. According to DOE officials, seven other applications were active as of July 18, 2025. Tribes said TEFP can finance a variety of energy projects needed for energy production and economic development. However, aspects of TEFP’s design and implementation create barriers. For example, DOE hires outside lawyers and technical experts to review projects. Tribal applicants are required to cover the costs of these services, which can be high and unpredictable. Tribes may avoid applying for the program until DOE revises its review processes to reduce or eliminate the cost. Additionally, there are few DOE program staff with tribal experience to review applications, which can lengthen reviews. Without staff with the necessary expertise, Tribes may continue to experience barriers to securing TEFP financing. Status of All 20 Applications to the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Tribal Energy Financing Program, as of February 2025 Note: Active applications include closed loans, which DOE has finalized with the applicant and continues to monitor throughout the loan term. Inactive applications have been put on hold, withdrawn, or abandoned. DOE officials confirmed that they had not received any new applications for the program as of July 18, 2025. How GAO Did This Study We analyzed agency data and documents and interviewed agency officials, potential tribal participants, and tribal stakeholders. We compared agency efforts with relevant laws, regulations, guidance, and executive orders.

What GAO Found The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead agency for coordinating federal disaster response efforts. This includes working with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) on debris removal and emergency repair of damaged public infrastructure and with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on household hazardous materials removal and sampling and analyzing contaminated water. Recent disasters highlight key challenges for the federal response workforce. Hurricanes Helene and Milton made landfall in the U.S. in late September and early October 2024, respectively, devastating portions of the southeastern U.S with catastrophic inland flooding, storm surges, and tornadoes. These disasters resulted in over 290 deaths, directly or indirectly, according to the National Hurricane Center. Starting January 7, 2025, a series of catastrophic wildfires developed in Los Angeles County, California. The wildfires killed more than two dozen people, destroyed more than 15,000 homes and businesses and created unhealthy air quality for millions of people. FEMA, USACE, and EPA, as well as other federal agencies, deployed thousands of personnel to respond. However, GAO found that the concurrent nature of the disasters, limited disaster workforce capacity, and undertrained surge responders posed challenges to federal agencies responding. For example, following Hurricanes Helene and Milton, only 4 percent of FEMA’s incident management workforce was available to deploy as of November 1, 2024. USACE and EPA also described challenges with responding to an increasing number of disasters. For example, EPA officials stated that the agency relies on its force of about 210-260 on-scene coordinators to respond to disasters. Deploying them for disaster response led to backlogs in these coordinators’ primary responsibilities related to oil and hazardous material spills. In February 2025, GAO added Improving the Delivery of Federal Disaster Assistance to its High-Risk List, in part due to longstanding challenges in this area and increasing demands. Congress and the President have signaled an interest in enacting broader reforms to FEMA’s scope and mission, including transitioning roles to state and local governments. Additionally, since January 2025, the Executive Branch has taken several steps to reduce the size of its workforce. For example: The number of active FEMA employees decreased from about 25,800 as of January 1 to about 23,350 as of June 1, 2025, according to FEMA data. This decrease of 2,446 includes the 1,465 employees who participated in a workforce reduction program as of June 1, 2025, and employees who left the agency for any other reason (see figure). FEMA reported that 24 Senior Executive Service employees had departed the agency between January 25 and June 1, 2025, just before the start of the hurricane season. Of these, 20 departed as part of a workforce reduction program. Agency officials noted it is challenging to lose staff with experience and expertise and that the agency now faces significant skills gaps in its leadership cadre. Officials at USACE and EPA also shared concerns about meeting disaster response mission responsibilities due to workforce reductions Workforce Changes at FEMA Between January 1 and June 1, 2025 While reform efforts are ongoing, as of this report, FEMA’s responsibilities related to disaster response have not changed. FEMA and other federal agencies spreading a reduced number of staff across the same or a higher number of disasters nationwide could reduce the effectiveness of federal disaster response for upcoming disasters. We will continue to monitor developments in this area as part of our ongoing work Why GAO Did This Study GAO was asked to review long-standing challenges and emerging issues in federal response efforts for recent disasters, including Hurricanes Helene and Milton and the 2025 Los Angeles wildfires. This report, the first in a series, provides information on the support selected federal agencies provided, workforce challenges that arose during recent disaster response efforts, and recent workforce changes and implications for future disasters. GAO conducted site visits to areas affected by these disasters; interviewed federal, state, and local officials; obtained agency data and documentation on FEMA workforce availability and reductions; and reviewed Executive Orders and other documentation about recent changes to the federal disaster workforce. For more information, contact Chris Currie at CurrieC@gao.gov.